Windows Kernel 64-bit pool memory disclosure in NtQueryVirtualMemory(MemoryMappedFilenameInformation)(CVE-2018-0894)

We have discovered that the nt!NtQueryVirtualMemory system call invoked with the 2 information class (MemoryMappedFilenameInformation) discloses portions of uninitialized kernel pool memory to user-mode clients. The vulnerability affects 64-bit versions of Windows 7 to 10.The output buffer for this information class is a UNICODE_STRING structure followed by the actual filename string. The output data is copied back to user-mode memory under the following stack trace (on Windows 7 64-bit):“` kd> k # Child-SP RetAddr Call Site 00 fffff880`03cfd8c8 fffff800`02970229 nt!memcpy+0x3 01 fffff880`03cfd8d0 fffff800`02970752 nt!IopQueryNameInternal+0x289 02 fffff880`03cfd970 fffff800`02967bb4 nt!IopQueryName+0x26 03 fffff880`03cfd9c0 fffff800`0296a80d nt!ObpQueryNameString+0xb0 04 fffff880`03cfdac0 fffff800`0268d093 nt!NtQueryVirtualMemory+0x5fb 05 fffff880`03cfdbb0 00000000`772abf6a nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x13“`The UNICODE_STRING structure is defined as follows:“` typedef struct _LSA_UNICODE_STRING { USHORT Length; USHORT MaximumLength; PWSTR Buffer; } LSA_UNICODE_STRING, *PLSA_UNICODE_STRING, UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING;“`On 64-bit builds, there is a 4-byte padding between the "MaximumLength" and "Buffer" fields inserted by the compiler, in order to align the "Buffer" pointer to 8 bytes. This padding is left uninitialized in the code and is copied in this form to user-mode clients, passing over left-over data from the kernel pool.The issue can be reproduced by running the attached proof-of-concept program on a 64-bit system with the Special Pools mechanism enabled for ntoskrnl.exe. Then, it is clearly visible that bytes at offsets 4-7 are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools, and would otherwise contain junk data that was previously stored in that memory region:“`— cut — 00000000: 6c 00 6e 00[37 37 37 37]f0 f6 af 87 dd 00 00 00 l.n.7777……..— cut — 00000000: 6c 00 6e 00[59 59 59 59]e0 f6 b3 0f c8 00 00 00 l.n.YYYY……..— cut — 00000000: 6c 00 6e 00[7b 7b 7b 7b]40 f1 af 16 18 00 00 00 l.n.{{{{@…….— cut — 00000000: 6c 00 6e 00[a3 a3 a3 a3]80 f0 90 aa 33 00 00 00 l.n………3…— cut –“`Update: The insecure behavior of nt!IopQueryNameInternal can be also reached via nt!NtQueryObject. See the following stack trace:“` kd> k # Child-SP RetAddr Call Site 00 fffff880`025548a8 fffff800`02970229 nt!memcpy+0x3 01 fffff880`025548b0 fffff800`02970752 nt!IopQueryNameInternal+0x289 02 fffff880`02554950 fffff800`02967bb4 nt!IopQueryName+0x26 03 fffff880`025549a0 fffff800`02971f7d nt!ObpQueryNameString+0xb0 04 fffff880`02554aa0 fffff800`0268d093 nt!NtQueryObject+0x1c7 05 fffff880`02554bb0 00000000`772abe3a nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x13“`And the region being copied:“` kd> db rdx rdx+r8-1 fffff8a0`01666bf0 2e 00 30 00 aa aa aa aa-00 6c 66 01 a0 f8 ff ff ..0……lf….. fffff8a0`01666c00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 76 00-69 00 63 00 65 00 5c 00 \.D.e.v.i.c.e.\. fffff8a0`01666c10 48 00 61 00 72 00 64 00-64 00 69 00 73 00 6b 00 H.a.r.d.d.i.s.k. fffff8a0`01666c20 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 75 00-6d 00 65 00 32 00 00 00 V.o.l.u.m.e.2…“`